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This paper presents novel evidence of price discrimination, using prices of identical goods in 
28  countries.  I  explain  the  observed  phenomenon  via  non-homothetic  preferences,  in  a 
model of trade with product differentiation and firm productivity heterogeneity. The model 
brings theory and data closer along a key dimension: it generates positively related prices of 
tradables  and  income,  while  preserving  exporter  behavior  and  trade  flows  of  existing 
frameworks. It further captures observations that richer countries buy more per product and 
consume more diverse bundles. Quantitatively, the model suggests that variable markups 
account for 80% of the positive price-income relationship across 123 countries. 
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A large empirical literature has demonstrated strong and persistent deviations from the
law of one price for tradable goods. Evidence stems from studies that examine cross-country
price levels of aggregate categories of goods, to tracking individual products across markets.1
Moreover, tradable goods prices are systematically positively related to countries’ per-capita
incomes. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) demonstrate that this relationship is particularly pro-
nounced among tradable consumption goods. Since these goods comprise consumption bun-
dles of individuals and their prices directly aﬀect consumer welfare, it is of central importance
to understand the underlying mechanisms that aﬀect the behavior of prices across countries.
I argue that ﬁrms’ variable mark-ups are a key contributor toward the positive price-
income relationship observed in the data. To that end, I introduce non-homothetic consumer
preferences over varieties into a general equilibrium model of international trade. Due to
the presence of trade frictions, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, with varying productivity
levels, are able to supply their products at destination-speciﬁc prices. With non-homothetic
preferences, diﬀerent levels of income result in non-constant shares of expenditure on diﬀerent
products, thus yielding varying price elasticities of demand for a given positively-consumed
variety across destinations. In particular, rich countries’ consumers are less responsive to
price changes than those of poor ones, so ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to price identical products
higher in more aﬄuent markets. Such systematic price discrimination is evident in a unique
dataset that I build, which features prices of hundreds of identical (barcode) products sold
online and shipped via courier at publicly-available rates to 28 markets.
The utility speciﬁcation I propose has the property that the marginal satisfaction agents
derive from consuming a good is bounded at any level of consumption. Since a tiny amount
of consumption per good does not give inﬁnite increase in utility, a consumer spends her lim-
ited income on the subset of potentially produced items, whose prices do not exceed marginal
valuations. An increase in income spurs consumers, who value variety, to not only buy more
per good, but to also buy a greater pool of goods. Hence, richer countries consume system-
atically more per good and more diverse sets of products, as reported by Jackson (1984),
Hunter and Markusen (1988), Hunter (1991), Movshuk (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005).
1Alessandria and Kaboski (2009) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007) employ prices of aggregate good cate-
gories, Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott (2004) study unit values from disaggregate trade data,
Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009), Crucini et al. (2005a), Crucini et al. (2005b) and Crucini and Shintani
(2008) use retail prices of products with identical characteristics, Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and
Goldberg and Verboven (2005) track car prices in Europe, Ghosh and Wolf (1994) and Haskel and Wolf
(2001) examine prices of the Economist magazine and IKEA products, respectively.
1Moreover, since ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity levels, only certain manufacturers can cover
production and shipping costs in order to place their good in the market. The marginal
ﬁrm sells its product at a price that barely covers its production and delivery cost, while
maintaining positive demand, thus realizing zero sales. Trade barriers keep exporters in the
minority and more productive ﬁrms sell more in each market. Facing higher demand in richer
countries, ﬁrms realize higher sales there, and more ﬁrms serve the aﬄuent markets. These
predictions are in line with the behavior of French exporters in 1986 reported by Eaton et al.
(2004) and Eaton et al. (2008).
The model is very useful for quantitative analysis, when ﬁrm productivities are Pareto-
distributed, as it yields a standard gravity equation of trade. This tool allows me to use
bilateral trade data to estimate trade barriers, which are signiﬁcantly higher for poor coun-
tries plagued by low productivities.2 The latter yield high costs of production, which coupled
with high trade barriers, keep trade shares of poor countries low and prices of tradable goods
high. On the contrary, high price elasticities of demand in poor countries force exporters to
sell their products at low prices there. Hence, the speciﬁcation of bilateral trade barriers and
the degree to which prices and quantities respond to them, namely the elasticity of trade
with respect to trade frictions, constitute key parameters that determine the success of the
model to quantitatively account for the price-income relationship observed in aggregate data.
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Prices of Tradable Goods [Jevons Index]
Figure 1: Price Level of Final Tradable Goods and Per-Capita GDP for 123 Countries
2Waugh (2009) demonstrates this ﬁnding for models of heterogeneity that rely on a Ricardian structure.
2Figure 1 plots the 2004 per-capita income and price level of ﬁnal tradable goods, which
constitute 87 percent of exported goods for the set of 123 countries portrayed in this plot.3
Clearly, ﬁnal tradable goods are systematically more expensive in richer countries, as the
aggregate price elasticity with respect to per-capita income amounts to roughly 0.11.4
To evaluate the ability of the model to quantitatively capture the relationship above, I
engage in a benchmark calibration exercise, where I choose the elasticity of trade so that
average mark-ups in the model are in line with cross-country data reported by Martins et al.
(1996), and bilateral trade frictions solely reﬂect physical barriers such as distance and bor-
der. The model then endogenously generates an elasticity of the price level of ﬁnal tradable
goods with respect to per-capita income of roughly 0.08. In addition, the calibrated model
suggests that the extensive margin of imports, when measured as in Hummels and Klenow
(2005), responds to per-capita and overall income with an elasticity of 0.46 and 0.23, respec-
tively. The corresponding statistics in cross-country data reported by Hummels and Klenow
(2005) are 0.45 and 0.26, respectively. Hence, the model generates roughly eighty percent
of the observed price-income relationship, while quantitatively reproducing the tight link
between the number of imported varieties and a country’s (per-capita) income.
The model does not explain the entire variation in prices, which can in turn be attributed
to many factors. Product quality diﬀerences contribute toward the positive relationship
between prices and income. Schott (2004) ﬁnds that prices implied by unit values of US
imports are signiﬁcantly higher, if sourced from capital-abundant countries. This suggests
that rich (capital-abundant) countries export high-quality goods. In addition, high wage
earners in rich countries may ﬁnd it too costly to spend time searching for goods, allowing
retailers to charge high mark-ups there, as argued by Alessandria and Kaboski (2009).
Indeed, the prices of ﬁnal tradable goods plotted in ﬁgure 1 are computed at the retail
3To measure the importance of ﬁnal goods in exports, I employ the publicly available US import data
per source country at the HS 6-digit level. I use UN concordance tables to translate HS 6-digit data into
Broad Economic Categories (BEC), which classify goods according to their use as intermediate versus ﬁnal
consumption goods. For the year 2004, I then compute each country’s share of consumption exports in total
goods exports to the United States, which results in an average statistic of 0.87. While an ideal measure of
the share of consumption goods in exports would be a bilateral computation of the aforementioned statistic,
I only have access to US HS 6-digit data, a level of disaggregation necessary in order to apply the BEC
concordance procedure. However, since the US represents a major importer of goods for each country in the
sample, this statistic is a good approximation.
4This is a typical summary statistic for tradable goods prices that is robust across time and datasets.
To verify, I construct geometric averages of 100+ individual tradable ﬁnal good prices across a sample of
76 countries in 2004, using data from the Economist Intelligence Unit. The price elasticity with respect
to per-capita income arising from this database varies from 0.1280(0.0160) to 0.1323(0.0173), depending on
whether prices are collected in low- or high-end stores.
3level and necessarily reﬂect local market characteristics, that may or may not be correlated
with a country’s per-capita income. As Burstein et al. (2003) argue, retail prices of tradables
contain local distribution costs. However, while these costs, together with sales taxes, cause
law of one price deviations, as documented by Campbell and Lapham (2004), they are not
necessarily higher in richer countries. Percentage sales taxes in European Union member
countries, the US and Canada do not follow a particular pattern. Furthermore, measured
productivity levels of the wholesale and retail trade sector, as well as the transportation and
storage sector, are not any lower in richer countries, suggesting prices of these services are
not necessarily higher there.5
Overall, in order to fully characterize the price-income relationship across countries, the
pricing-to-market mechanism proposed in this paper can be enriched by the product-quality
dimension of Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) and the elastic labor supply of Alessandria and Kaboski
(2009), and incorporated into frameworks that feature standard Balassa-Samuelson eﬀects
such as those of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bergin et al. (2006).
To summarize, the present paper contributes toward the understanding of the positive
relationship between per-capita income and price level of ﬁnal tradable goods, which is
not only key in determining relative investment and growth patterns across countries as
argued by Hsieh and Klenow (2007), but is also central in measuring the welfare of consumers
as emphasized by Broda and Romalis (2009). Section 2 of the paper outlines a general
equilibrium model of trade. Section 3 derives the qualitative predictions of the model and
presents empirical support of the proposed mechanism. Section 4 evaluates the quantitative
ability of the model to account for observed patterns in the data. Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A outlines a benchmark homothetic model of trade. Appendices B, C, D and E
detail measurement, calibration and algebra. Appendix F contains ﬁgures and tables.
2 Model
I propose a model in which ﬁrms practice pricing-to-market. The model incorporates non-
homothetic consumer preferences into the monopolistic competition framework of Melitz
(2003) and Chaney (2008), which features product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrm productivity
heterogeneity. The result is a new set of predictions on cross-country consumption and price
patterns, complemented by desirable features of exporters and trade ﬂows of existing models.
5Figure 7 in appendix F plots the percentage sales tax in European Union countries, US and Canada
versus each country’s per-capita income. Figure 6 in appendix F plots productivities of each sector, provided
by Inklaar and Timmer (2009), against per-capita income for a set of 13 countries in 2004.
42.1 Consumer Problem
I consider a world of I countries engaged in trade of ﬁnal goods, where I is ﬁnite.6 Let
i represent an exporter and j an importer, that is, i is the source country, while j is the
destination country.
I assume each country is populated by identical consumers of measure L, whose utility






c (ω) + ¯ q)dω, (1)
where qc (ω) is individual consumption of variety ω and ¯ q > 0 is a (non-country-speciﬁc)
constant.7 To ensure that the utility function is well deﬁned, I assume Ω ⊆ ¯ Ω, where ¯ Ω is a
compact set containing all potentially produced varieties in the world.
Each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm, where ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated by their produc-
tivity, φ, and country of origin, i.8 Any two ﬁrms originating from country i and producing
with productivity level φ choose identical optimal pricing rules.9 In every country i, there
exists a pool of potential entrants who pay a ﬁxed cost, fe > 0, and subsequently draw a
productivity from a distribution, G(φ), with support [bi,∞). A measure Ji of them enter in
equilibrium, but only a subset of producers, Nij, sell to a particular market j. Their density,
conditional on selling to j, is  ij(φ). Nij also represents the measure of goods of i-origin
consumed in j.
6Throughout the paper I use the terms good and variety interchangeably.










where σ → 1. Notice, ¯ q = 0 yields homothetic CES preferences. Throughout the paper, I exploit the
analytical tractability of the limiting case. A separate appendix describes the limitations of this highly
tractable framework and explores quantitative predictions of the model using the generalized utility function.
8The assumption of ﬁrm-productivity heterogeneity diﬀerentiates the present model from existing models
that employ similar preferences. In particular, Young (1991) uses the non-homothetic log-utility function
with ¯ q set to unity, in a Ricardian framework to analyze the growth patterns of countries when ﬁrms engage
in learning-by-doing. Recently, Saure (2009) employs the parameterization of Young (1991) in a monopolistic
competition framework featuring ﬁrms with homogeneous productivities, to study the extensive margin of
exporting. As it turns out, assuming ﬁrm productivities to be heterogeneous has two distinct advantages:
ﬁrst, the log model yields a constant average mark-up per market, which is uniquely determined by the
Pareto shape parameter of the ﬁrm productivity distribution, allowing me to calibrate the parameter using
mark-up data; second, for a given Pareto shape parameter, ﬁrm heterogeneity allows me to calibrate the
elasticity parameter in the general utility function in order to match the distribution of ﬁrm sales reported
in Eaton et al. (2004) and Eaton et al. (2008) for France.
9Thus, I can index each variety by the productivity of its producer.
5A representative consumer in country j has a unit labor endowment, which, when supplied
(inelastically) to the labor market, earns her a wage rate of wj. As free entry of ﬁrms drives
average proﬁts to zero, per-capita income of country j, yj, corresponds to the wage rate, wj.
The demand for a variety of type φ originating from country i consumed in a positive
amount in destination j, qij (φ) > 0, is given by:10
qij (φ) = Lj
 




















An operating ﬁrm must choose the price of its good p, accounting for the demand for its
product q. A ﬁrm with productivity draw φ faces a constant returns to scale production
function, x(φ) = φl, where l represents the amount of labor used toward the production of
ﬁnal output. Furthermore, each ﬁrm from country i wishing to sell to destination j faces an
iceberg transportation cost incurred in terms of labor units, τij > 1, with τii = 1 (∀i).
Substituting for the demand function using expression (2), the proﬁt maximization prob-



















Total ﬁrm proﬁts are the sum of proﬁt ﬂows from all destinations served. The resulting










10I derive consumer demand in appendix C.1, and optimal prices in appendix C.2.
62.3 Productivity Thresholds and Firm Mark-Ups
In this model, not all ﬁrms serve all destinations. In particular, for any source and destination
pair of countries, i,j, only ﬁrms originating from country i with productivity draws φ ≥ φ∗
ij
sell to market j, where φ∗






Thus, a productivity threshold is the productivity draw of a ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between
serving a market or not, namely one whose good’s price barely covers the ﬁrm’s marginal












The price a ﬁrm would charge for its variety, however, is limited by the variety’s demand,
which diminishes as the variety’s price rises. In particular, it is the case that consumers in
destination j are indiﬀerent between buying the variety of type φ∗
ij or not. To see this, from








wj + ¯ qPj
Nj¯ q
. (8)





(wj + ¯ qPj)
. (9)
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j       
mark-up marginal cost
11I restrict fe to ensure bi ≤ φ∗
ij(∀i,j).
12The model does not rely on ﬁxed costs to pin down productivity cutoﬀs. Rather, consumer income
aﬀects the measure of varieties demanded, thus determining the measure of ﬁrms per market. Here, market
size plays little role in ﬁrm entry, unlike in the CES models with ﬁxed costs of Melitz (2003) and Chaney
(2008), a variant of which is in appendix A, or models with quadratic preferences and no ﬁxed costs such as
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), where in the latter, the utility speciﬁcation gives importance to market size.
7In this model, mark-ups are not only higher for more productive ﬁrms, as reported by
Loecker and Warzynski (2009), but they are also determined by the local conditions of the
destination market, summarized by the threshold ﬁrms must surpass in order to serve a
destination. I proceed to characterize these thresholds next.
2.4 Equilibrium of the World Economy
In this model, a potential entrant from country i pays a ﬁxed cost fe > 0 in labor units,
and subsequently draws a productivity from a cdf, G(φ), with corresponding pdf, g(φ), and
support [bi,∞). A measure Ji of ﬁrms enter in equilibrium. Firm entry and exit drives
average proﬁts to zero. In addition, only a subset of producers, Nij, sell to market j.
These ﬁrms, in turn, are productive enough so as to surpass the productivity threshold
characterizing destination j, φ∗
ij. Hence, Nij satisﬁes:
Nij = Ji[1 − G(φ
∗
ij)]. (10)


























where potential proﬁts from destination υ are weighted by the probability that they are
realized, 1 − G(φ∗
















Equilibrium. For i,j = 1,...,I, given τij,Lj,bi,fe, ¯ q, and a productivity distribution G(φ),
an equilibrium is a set of productivity thresholds ˆ φ∗
ij; measures of entrants ˆ Ji; measures of
ﬁrms from i serving j ˆ Nij; total measures of ﬁrms serving j ˆ Nj; conditional densities of ﬁrms
from i serving j ˆ  ij(φ); aggregate price statistics ˆ Pj; wage rates ˆ wj; per-consumer allocations
ˆ qc
ij(φ); total consumer allocations ˆ qij(φ); decision rules ˆ pij(φ) for ﬁrms φ, ∀φ ∈ [bi,∞), such
that: (i) (32) solves the individual consumer’s problem; (ii) (2) satisﬁes a country’s aggregate
demand for a variety; (iii) (5) solves the ﬁrm’s problem;13 (iv) ˆ φ∗
ij, ˆ Nij, ˆ Nj, ˆ  ij(φ), ˆ Pj, ˆ wi, ˆ Ji
jointly satisfy (9), (10), (3), (11), (4), (14) and (15); (v) goods’ markets clear, ˆ qij(φ) = ˆ xij(φ).
3 Qualitative Predictions and Empirical Support
In this section, I discuss the model’s novel predictions regarding the behavior of prices and
margins of trade across countries. While I draw on existing empirical work on the margins
of trade, I bring forward new evidence in support of the pricing mechanism that arises in
this framework.
In order to analytically solve the model and derive stark predictions at the ﬁrm and
aggregate levels, I assume that ﬁrm productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution
with cdf G(φ) = 1 − bθ
i/φθ, pdf g(φ) = θbθ
i/φθ+1 and shape parameter θ > 0.14 The support
of the distribution is [bi,∞), where bi summarizes the level of technology in country i.15
Moreover, varying levels of technology are related to per-capita income diﬀerences across
countries. In particular, a relatively high bi represents a more technologically-advanced
country. Such a country is characterized by relatively more productive ﬁrms, whose marginal
cost of production is low, and by richer consumers, who enjoy higher wages. The sections
below study how exporters respond to such market conditions.
13Another equilibrium restriction for models of monopolistic competition is no cross-country arbitrage:
pij(φ) ≤ piυ(φ)τυj (∀i,υ,j). The inequality involves equilibrium objects, such as productivity thresholds,
which in turn reﬂect wages. In the quantitative analysis in section 4, I demonstrate that arbitrage opportu-
nities in calibrated monopolistic competition models, with constant or variable mark-ups, arise only under
asymmetric speciﬁcations of trade barriers.
14Kortum (1997), Eaton et al. (2008), Luttmer (2007) and Arkolakis (2008a), among others, provide the-
oretical justiﬁcations for the use of the Pareto distribution.
15bi can be thought of as a source of Ricardian comparative advantage in this framework.
93.1 Per-Capita Income and the Margins of Trade
In this model, per-capita income plays a central role in determining cross-country trade
patterns. To illustrate the importance of income in trade, it is useful to examine φ∗
ij, the





















Looking at comparative statics, expression (16) shows that productivity thresholds respond
marginally and positively to the population, but strongly and negatively to the per-capita
income of the destination market.17 Intuitively, recall that the marginal utility of a variety,
(qc(φ) + ¯ q)−1, is bounded at any level of consumption. Since a tiny amount of consumption
of a good does not give inﬁnite increase in utility, the consumer spends her limited income on
the subset of potentially produced items whose prices do not exceed marginal valuations. An
increase in income makes new goods aﬀordable and the consumer expands her consumption
bundle accordingly. Hence, richer countries import, and therefore consume, a larger pool
of varieties, as reported by Hummels and Klenow (2005), Jackson (1984), Hunter (1991),
Hunter and Markusen (1988), and Movshuk (2004).18 Finally, high trade barriers, τij, raise
costs of importing, forcing consumers to import fewer varieties from a particular source.
The eﬀects of income and trade barriers on the measure of imported varieties, or the
extensive import margin, are neatly summarized in expression (17) below. To arrive there,
substitute expressions (16) and (38) into (10), to obtain the relative measure of varieties





















      
, (17)
barriers income mkt share
16See appendix C.3 for a characterization of all equilibrium objects.
17It is easy to verify that the (absolute value of the) elasticity of thresholds with respect to per-capita
income exceeds the elasticity with respect to size, making elasticity with respect to destination GDP negative.
18Due to the absence of ﬁxed costs in this model, population size has marginal eﬀects on the extensive
margin. For ﬁxed trade barriers, comparative statics with respect to Lj suggest that variety consumption is
lower in bigger markets, but since the elasticity with respect to per-capita income exceeds that of population,
markets with larger GDP consume signiﬁcantly more varieties, as reported by Hummels and Klenow (2005).










In expression (17), the ﬁrst term emphasizes the role of trade barriers, the second captures
per-capita income eﬀects, and the third represents market share, where the contribution of
the particular destination’s characteristics is marginal, as it is washed away within a large
summation term. Since trade barriers and per-capita income mainly aﬀect consumer demand
for varieties, these two variables also guide the behavior of exporting ﬁrms across countries.
Large trade barriers keep exporters in the minority, whereas high demand in rich countries
draws more ﬁrms to enter such markets. Moreover, after adjusting for market share, more


























The model’s predictions regarding entry and sales behavior of exporters is in line with em-
pirical work. In particular, Eaton et al. (2004) and Eaton et al. (2008) use 1986 data to
document that French exporters are in the minority, and a larger number of them enter
richer and bigger markets, after adjusting for French market share per destination.
Finally, the model predicts that, on average, ﬁrms sell more in richer and larger markets,










Hence, the model suggests that the intensive margin of trade is positively related to the per-
capita income and size of the market, an empirical regularity reported by Hummels and Klenow
(2005) for a large sample of countries.
Overall, this section has demonstrated that, in this model, exporters behave in accordance
with observations in cross-country data. Moreover, the force to which exporters respond is
consumer demand, which is highly sensitive to the per-capita income that characterizes
each country.19 As it turns out, per-capita income also plays a central role in shaping the
systematic behavior of prices across countries, to which I turn next.
19Fieler (2007) demonstrates the importance of non-homothetic preferences in determining trade patterns
across rich and poor countries in the Ricardian framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002).
113.2 Per-Capita Income, Prices and Mark-Ups
In this model, ﬁrms’ prices and mark-ups across markets vary systematically with the mar-
kets’ characteristics. Within a market, however, ﬁrm behavior is in line with existing frame-
works that feature producer heterogeneity.
Consider two ﬁrms with productivity draws φ1 and φ2, originating from countries 1 and
2, respectively, and selling to market j. From expression (6), the relative price of the goods










The intimate relationship between relative prices and relative marginal costs of ﬁrms within
a country is not particular to this model. In fact, a similar prediction arises in frameworks
that feature heterogeneous productivity ﬁrms and homothetic (CES) preferences, such as
the model of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), a variant of which is outlined in appendix A.
In the CES model, ﬁrms charge a constant and destination-invariant mark-up over marginal
cost of production and delivery, as long as consumer preferences are identical across countries.
Hence, the (net) average mark-up across ﬁrms in a given market is constant, which is also
















assuming θ > 0.5.20
However, in the non-homothetic model, an individual ﬁrm behaves very diﬀerently across
markets with diﬀerent characteristics. For an illustration, consider a ﬁrm with productivity
draw φ, originating from country i and selling an identical variety to markets j and k, that
is, φ ≥ max[φ∗
ij,φ∗





















      
. (22)
barriers income market share
20The homothetic Bertrand-competition model of Bernard et al. (2003) and the non-homothetic
monopolistic-competition model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also predict constant average mark-ups.
12Expression (22) shows that a ﬁrm primarily accounts for shipping costs and the per-capita
income of the destination, when it prices its good across countries. High trade barriers raise
the ﬁrm’s cost of shipping to a market, resulting in a high price of the ﬁnal good upon arrival.
Moreover, the ﬁrm is able to sell its good at a high price in a rich destination. Hence, the
ﬁrm price-dscriminates according to the per-capita income of the destination.














The productivity thresholds that appear in the relative prices above actually govern elastic-
ities of demand across countries. In particular, the (absolute value of the) price-elasticity of












If market j is characterized by high per-capita income, the productivity threshold to sell
there is low. According to expression (24), a low threshold yields inelastic demand for a
good in the rich market. Moreover, the elasticity of demand is reﬂected in the price of the










In sum, consumers in rich countries are less responsive to price changes than consumers in
poor ones. A ﬁrm exploits this opportunity, amid trade barriers that segment the markets,
and charges a high mark-up in the aﬄuent destination.
However, the same ﬁrm extracts a low mark-up in a more populated market. Larger
markets are in eﬀect more competitive, thus preventing relatively less productive ﬁrms to
enter (recall that φ∗
ij is higher there). Due to tough competition, the price and mark-up of
a surviving ﬁrm is lower there.21 Yet, since elasticities of thresholds are higher with respect
to per-capita income over population, each ﬁrm prices its product higher in a market with
greater total output.
The positive relationship between prices and per-capita income predicted by the model is
21Along the market size-price dimension, the present model behaves like those of Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Feenstra (2003).
13in line with a series of empirical ﬁndings. However, existing studies do not provide direct sup-
port for the underlying mechanism that operates in the model, since they cannot measure the
eﬀect diﬀering demand elasticities have on ﬁrms’ mark-ups. Alessandria and Kaboski (2009),
Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Schott (2004), Hummels and Lugovskyy
(2009), Crucini et al. (2005a), Crucini et al. (2005b) and Crucini and Shintani (2008) study
prices of aggregate good categories or prices of goods with similar characteristics across coun-
tries. Since goods are not identical, prices reﬂect variable product quality, which is higher in
rich countries, as Schott (2004) argues. Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Goldberg and Verboven
(2005), Ghosh and Wolf (1994) and Haskel and Wolf (2001) track individual goods across
countries. But, prices are collected from retail locations and reﬂect local costs, which are
arguably higher in rich countries due to standard Balassa-Samuelson eﬀects.
For these reasons, in the following section, I outline results obtained from a unique
database that features prices of identical products sold online, which allows me to establish
a direct link between demand elasticities and mark-ups across countries.
3.3 Pricing-to-Market: Evidence from Mango’s Online Store
I present direct evidence that the Spanish clothing manufacturing company Mango system-
atically price-discriminates according to the per-capita income of the market it sells to.
Mango specializes in the production of clothing for middle-income female consumers and
sells its items both online and in stores around the world.22 I collect data from Mango’s
online store, which in 2008 served 28 countries in Europe as well as Canada.23 Each country
has a website and customers from one country cannot buy products from another country’s
website due to shipping restrictions. Thus, a customer with a physical shipping address in
Germany can only have items delivered to her if purchased from the German Mango website.
I collect data on all 190 items featured in the Summer/Winter ‘08 online catalogues,
which became available in March/September.24 In each country, the catalogue lists item
prices in the local currency. I use average monthly exchange rates for February and August
of 2008, to convert all values into Euro, the currency used in the home country, Spain.25
22Often items sold online do not appear in stores and vice verse.
23I exclude the US market because the set of products sold there diﬀers entirely from other markets. I
exclude Spanish and British islands and territories as well as city states due to lack of aggregate data.
24This eliminates seasonal biases in clothing prices in diﬀerent regions.
25I choose to work with February/August data because the catalogue became available in
March/September and the company would have had to set the price before placing the catalogue into circu-
lation. I repeat the analysis with exchange rate data for the months of January/July and March/September
of 2008 and ﬁnd changes in the coeﬃcients that are not statistically signiﬁcant.
14Each item in the catalogue has a unique name and an 8-digit code reported in every
country. This enables me to collect prices of identical products across markets. Prices listed
on the website include sales taxes (VAT), which I adjust for accordingly, but exclude tariﬀs
since all countries are members of the European Union.26 Thus, once I remove the sales tax,
prices include production costs, mark-ups and transportation costs.27
The shipping and handling policy of Mango is such that no fee is incurred for purchases
above a minimum value, which diﬀers across countries. Thus, not only does a single product,
whose price is above this minimum, incur no shipping charge, but also any bundle of goods
with value above the minimum satisﬁes the free-shipping requirement. All other purchases
incur a shipping and handling fee. Many items sold by Mango classify for free shipping.
However, it is not always the case that the same product ships at no fee to diﬀerent desti-
nations, since the minimum price requirement as well as the actual Euro-denominated price
of the product often diﬀer. Thus, it is necessary to control for shipping costs in the analysis.
This task is facilitated by the fact that Mango uses DHL Express to ship its products from a
single warehouse located outside of Barcelona, Spain, to every destination.28 I collect DHL
Express shipping quotes from Mango’s warehouse address to each destination country and
use them as an independent control for transportation costs in my analysis.29 Finally, I use
2008 nominal per-capita income from the World Bank in my analysis of the relationship
between prices and income.30
Equation (25) below summarizes the regression framework used to analyze the pricing
practices of Mango:
logpij = αi + βy logyj + βτ logτj + ǫij, (25)
where pij is the pre-tax price of good i in country j in Euros, yj is per-capita income of
26Canada applies sales taxes and import duties at checkout, so no price adjustment is necessary.
27I conducted a controlled experiment to ensure that quality diﬀerences are not an issue since I veriﬁed that
identical items are produced in a single location, regardless of the market to which they are sold. Diﬀerent
items (ex. skirt vs. shirt) may be produced in diﬀerent countries, but the same item (ex. skirt) is sourced
from a single location and sold to all destinations. Since I study relative prices, the actual marginal cost of
producing a particular good is irrelevant, for it is the same regardless of the market to which an item is sold.
28I conducted a controlled experiment and collected DHL tracking codes for an identical item sent to all
28 destinations and veriﬁed that the shipping and production origin are identical regardless of destination.
29I have veriﬁed with DHL that regular customers receive a percentage discount, which leaves relative
shipping costs across destinations unaltered.
30I repeat the analysis with PPP-adjusted per-capita income, and for a subset of the countries (for which
data are available), I repeat the analysis with manufacturing wages, which correspond to per-capita income in
the model. Estimated elasticities of price with respect to income are higher than in the benchmark analysis.
15country j and τj is the DHL Express shipping charge from Barcelona to destination j. The
coeﬃcients βy and βτ can be interpreted as the estimated elasticities of price with respect
to per-capita income and transportation cost, while αi is a good i-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect.31
I use the “within” (ﬁxed-eﬀects) estimator and report White robust standard errors
and t-statistics of coeﬃcients in column A of table 1 in appendix F.32 The regression yields
estimates for βy and βτ of 0.0761 (0.0023) and 0.1577 (0.0030), respectively. Thus, controlling
for transportation costs and good-speciﬁc characteristics, countries that are twice as rich in
per-capita terms pay over 7% more for identical items.
In the same table, I address the issue of taste heterogeneity by controlling for the Scan-
dinavian, Eastern European and Mediterranean regions.33 I further control for demographic
characteristics of each market, such as the size of the adult female population, and the Gini
income inequality coeﬃcient, which aﬀect pricing practices of ﬁrms when consumers are
modeled to have non-homothetic preferences.34 Moreover, in order to control for the possi-
bility that Mango responds to competitive pressures when pricing its products, I use data
on the number of stores its major competitors Zara, Miss Sixty and Bershka have in each
destination. Across these scenarios, price elasticities with respect to income range between
0.0396 and 0.0750. Finally, I obtain per-capita television advertising costs for a subsample
of Western European countries, to control for the possible eﬀects marketing expenditures
may have on prices charged across diﬀerent destinations, and ﬁnd an increase in the price
elasticity with respect to income to 0.3701.
In column B of table 1 in appendix F, I repeat all exercises for a subset of countries
that belong to the Euro zone as of January 1, 2008, allowing me to exclude exchange rates
from the analysis. The estimated elasticity of price with respect to income rises to 0.1204
(0.0027), after controlling for transportation costs and good-speciﬁc characteristics.
The empirical analysis in this section allows me to conclude that Mango exploits cross-
country diﬀerences in price elasticities of demand and sets systematically higher prices and
mark-ups in richer destinations.
31I employ good-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to capture good-speciﬁc observable and unobservable characteristics
that aﬀect item prices.
32Errors clustered by country do not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the results.
33Taste heterogeneity would undermine my results if preferences over Mango clothes were systematically
(and positively) related to income. Given the presence of much more expensive clothing brands in richer
countries, preferences for Mango clothes are likely stronger in poorer rather than richer countries.
34See Lu (2010) for an extension of the log non-homothetic model I propose in this paper that features
within-country consumer heterogeneity and richer micro-level pricing implications.
164 Quantitative Analysis
The model outlined in the previous section has a rich set of predictions, which are con-
sistent with empirical regularities observed in the data. However, the analysis so far has
been reduced to comparative static exercises, under the assumption of exogenously ﬁxed
parameter values. But, some of the parameter values vary systematically with certain coun-
try characteristics, such as per-capita income. Consequently, in this section, I evaluate the
quantitative ability of the mechanism introduced in this paper to account for observed cross-
country patterns in aggregate price levels of ﬁnal tradable goods. The analysis will allow
me to address the following two questions: First, what are the key parameters that lie be-
hind the quantitative success of the model? Second, to what extent can the model generate
the price-income relationship that characterizes the 123 economies considered in the intro-
ductory section, while maintaining quantitative consistency with remaining macroeconomic
phenomena across these countries?
To being answering the ﬁrst question, it is useful to substitute expression (18) into (22),
and re-examine the decomposition of the relative price of an identical good produced by a
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barriers income general equilibrium object
Clearly, the numerical value of the entry cost, fe, and the utility parameter, ¯ q, do not alter
relative prices, provided that they are chosen subject to the restrictions imposed by the
modeling framework. Furthermore, notice that the ﬁrst term emphasizes the role of trade
barriers, the second determines the extent to which per-capita income aﬀects prices via
the Pareto shape parameter, and the third represents a general equilibrium object, where
the contribution of the particular destination’s characteristics is marginal since they are
washed away within a large summation term. Relatively higher trade barriers increase
prices as they raise the marginal cost of delivery to the ﬁnal destination. The Pareto shape
parameter aﬀects the extent to which per-capita income diﬀerences generate relative price
diﬀerences across countries. In particular, lower values of θ magnify the importance of per-
capita income on the determination of prices. Intuitively, a low Pareto shape parameter
results in high variability in ﬁrm productivity, thus making goods more dissimilar and less
17substitutable, which increases the ability of each ﬁrm to price-discriminate according to the
per-capita income of the consumers. Finally, as is apparent in the third object above, the
price of a good is lower in relatively larger and more productive countries due to the tougher
competition each ﬁrm faces there.
4.1 Benchmark Calibration
4.1.1 Parameter Choices
To begin the exposition, it is useful to analyze the gravity equation of trade suggested by
the model. Employing the methodology of Eaton and Kortum (2002), the gravity equation






= Sj − Si − θlogτij, (27)
where Sj and Si represent importer-j and exporter-i ﬁxed eﬀects, with Sj = θlog(wj) −
log(Lj) − θlog(bj)(∀j). Given θ and an assumed relationship between trade barriers and
other exogenous factors, the barriers themselves can be estimated via equation (27), using a
simple ﬁxed-eﬀects OLS regression.
I begin by assuming the following functional form for trade barriers corresponding to
positive bilateral trade ﬂows:
logτij = dk + b + δij, (28)
where the dummy variable associated with each eﬀect has been suppressed for notational
simplicity. In the above expression, dk, k = 1,...,6, quantiﬁes the eﬀect of the distance
between i and j lying in the k-th interval36, b captures the importance of sharing a border
and δij is an error term.37 The resulting R-squared from the OLS regression for the sample
35Import shares, λij’s, are straightforward to compute from the bilateral trade ﬂows data reported by UN
Comtrade. I take bilateral trade ﬂows that correspond to ISIC manufacturing categories only, using the
concordance proposed by Muendler (2009) and UN Comtrade data at the SITC 4-digit level. Thus, my data
excludes agricultural goods. I compute the domestic share of total expenditure, λjj, as the residual of gross
output that is not imported, where I impute gross output for countries with missing data, using existing
gross output ﬁgures for a subsample of countries, together with 2004 WDI manufacturing value added, GDP
and population data in a cubic regression framework.
36Intervals are in miles: [0,375); [375,750); [750,1500); [1500,3000); [3000,6000); and [6000,maximum].
37I obtain distance and border data from World Bank’s Trade, Production and Protection Database
provided by Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).
18of 123 countries considered in this paper is 0.8031.
For a pair of countries with positive bilateral trade ﬂows, the estimated trade barriers
are equivalent. However, for a pair of countries in which only one trading partner exports
to the other and not vice verse, the non-exporter is assigned an inﬁnitely high trade barrier,
since the log-linear expression above does not allow for zero bilateral trades.38 Under this
speciﬁcation, I allow the mechanism in the model to generate asymmetric bilateral trade
ﬂows, with the exception of zeros.
Continuing on with the gravity equation, a value for the Pareto shape parameter θ is
necessary in order to estimate trade barriers. θ, in turn, represents the elasticity of trade,
since it governs the rate of change of trade ﬂows with respect to trade barriers, as can be
seen from (27). I take a value for θ of 3.8333, which, according to expression (21), yields
average mark-up over marginal cost in the economy of 1.15, a midpoint of the estimated
mark-up range for the manufacturing sector in OECD countries reported by Martins et al.
(1996). This value falls within the 3.6−4.6 range reported by Simonovska and Waugh (2010),
obtained using Simulated Method of Moments in Ricardian and monopolistic competition
trade models of heterogeneity.
The remainder of the parameters are determined in the general equilibrium solution
of the model, given trade barriers, the elasticity of trade and data on per-capita income,
population, average US ﬁrm sales and average US ﬁrm size.39 The minimum productivity
bound of each country relative to the US, bi/bUS, targets the country’s per-capita income
relative to the US. bUS is in turn chosen to match average US ﬁrm sales in 2002 of USD
11,161,200. Finally, as shown above, ﬁxed costs of market entry and the utility parameter
do not aﬀect relative prices. Nonetheless, I select values for them, since they act as scale
multiples of the remaining parameters in the model. The utility parameter ¯ q, which scales
sales and proﬁts of ﬁrms, targets average US ﬁrm size of 41 workers per ﬁrm. The ﬁxed cost
of entry fe, which scales productivity thresholds, is chosen to ensure that lower productivity
bounds do not exceed thresholds, mini,j φ∗
ij/bi = 1. A detailed description of the system of
equations characterizing equilibrium in the calibrated model can be found in appendix D.
38This asymmetry has implications regarding cross-country arbitrage. Suppose country i does not export
to j, but exports to k. Further suppose k exports to j. Then, τij = +∞, but τik,τkj < +∞, and regardless
of the price a ﬁrm from i would charge to k, there would always be an arbitrage opportunity to re-export
to j, where the price is inﬁnite. Ignoring these trivial cases when checking for arbitrage opportunities, the
calibrated model violates triangular arbitrage in only one instant, which given the total number of triangular
arbitrage permutations possible for 123 countries, is not statistically signiﬁcant.
392004 per-capita and population data are from WDI. 2002 average US ﬁrm sales and ﬁrm size data are
from Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM).
194.1.2 Income Diﬀerences and Prices of Tradables
In this section, I evaluate the ability of the model to account for the observed diﬀerences
in prices of ﬁnal tradable goods across countries. As discussed in section 1, tradable goods
are systematically more expensive in richer (per-capita) countries and the estimated price
elasticity with respect to income is 0.1066 (0.0121).40 In order to evaluate the ability of the
model to reconcile these observations, I solve its calibrated version and calculate the price
levels of tradable goods.41












































































































































































































Figure 2: Price Level of Final Tradable Goods and Per-Capita GDP for 123 Countries
Figure 2 plots the price-income relationship for 123 countries resulting from the data and
the model, whose parameters have been calibrated to match the moments discussed above.42
The elasticity of the price level of tradables with respect to per-capita income suggested by
the model is 0.0873 (0.0085). Thus, the model captures roughly 80 percent of the relationship
40This elasticity drops to 0.1042 (0.0115) when I add country population size to the regression, whose
coeﬃcient is in turn -0.0430 (0.0115).
41The price data I am interested in is from the 2005 International Comparison ProgramBenchmark Studies.
I use data at the basic-heading level, the lowest level of aggregation possible, and combine it to calculate
price indices according to the Jevons method. I repeat the procedure for the model. Appendix B describes
the accounting procedure for the data and the model in detail.
42I combine 2005-price data with 2004 data on all other income- and trade-related statistics due to avail-
ability limitations. Moreover, since the ICP round was carried out during the 2003-2005 period, prices likely
reﬂect 2004-levels. An exception is Zimbabwe, which experienced extreme hyperinﬂation during this period,
which is why I exclude it from my analysis.
20observed in the data.43
To understand the quantitative result, refer to expression (26), which decomposed the
relative price of a good into the direct eﬀects of trade barriers and per-capita income, via
the elasticity of trade, and the indirect eﬀects caused by the general equilibrium object.
In the benchmark speciﬁcation, trade barriers are assumed to be symmetric between a
pair of countries, as long as both countries positively export to each other. If one country
fails to export to another, it is assumed to face an inﬁnitely high trade barrier toward that
destination. The latter is particularly common for poor countries, but it has little eﬀect
on relative prices, because prices of goods are not recorded when sales are not realized.44
Moreover, due to the symmetry assumption, bilateral barriers for country pairs with positive
trade are not systematically related to per-capita income, so they only add noise to the price-
income relationship. The magnitude of the latter relationship is then largely dependent on
the elasticity of trade, which if lower, allows for a stronger positive correlation between
prices and income. Hence, it is important to verify that the chosen value of this parameter
is quantitatively consistent with other macroeconomic variables.
One such variable is the average mark-up in a country, which is entirely pinned down by
θ in expression (21). This statistics takes on an average value of 1.15 across manufacturing
industries in OECD countries, as reported by Martins et al. (1996), and served as the target
for θ in the benchmark calibration. But, more importantly, θ also aﬀects the response
of the extensive import margin in this economy to the per-capita income of the importer.
The relationship can be seen in expression (17), which shows that the strength of the direct
contribution of per-capita income to the extensive import margin is determined by the choice
of the elasticity of trade, θ.
In order to verify the choice of θ in the benchmark calibration, I test the quantitative
relationship between the extensive import margin and per-capita income predicted by the
model. To do so, I derive a measure of the extensive margin for each country in my sample,
using the methodology of Hummels and Klenow (2005). While a detailed algebraic derivation
can be found in appendix E, a country’s extensive import margin essentially measures the
fraction of world imports that occur in the source-categories in which that country imports.
With this measure in mind, the elasticity of the extensive margin of imports with respect
43The price elasticity with respect to per-capita income in the calibrated model drops to 0.0867 (0.0085)
when I add country population size to the regression, whose coeﬃcient is in turn -0.0114 (0.0085).
44The Jevons methodology to compute price levels is particularly useful in minimizing the bias due to
missing goods prices as it computes relative prices via cross exchange rates implied by all countries in the
sample. This is discussed in detail in appendix B.
21to per-capita income arising from the calibrated model is 0.47(0.06). The same statistic
with respect to total income of a country is 0.24(0.05). In turn, the corresponding statistics
reported by Hummels and Klenow (2005) for a set of 59 importers from 110 sources in
1996 are 0.45(0.06) and 0.26(0.03), respectively. Hence, the results support the choice of
parameters that constitute the benchmark calibration of the model.
4.2 Importance of Trade Barriers
Trade barrier estimates from gravity models of trade have serious quantitative implications
about the relationship between prices and income. From the ﬁrst term in expression (26),
notice that, should trade barriers be systematically related to per-capita income, they would
aﬀect the quantitative price-income relationship generated by the model. In order to al-
low for a potential systematic relationship between trade frictions and per-capita income,
I depart from the assumed symmetry in the benchmark exercise, and modify the barriers
in (28) to incorporate either importer- or exporter-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, as postulated by
Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Waugh (2009), respectively.
Trade barrier estimates eﬀectively alter measured bilateral marginal costs of delivery.
To illustrate how measured delivery costs behave across countries, it is useful to suppress
mark-ups from the analysis. This can be achieved by examining a model in which ﬁrms
charge constant mark-ups, but production and delivery costs are identical to the model
with variable mark-ups. The CES framework of Melitz (2003), achieves just that, when ﬁrm
productivities are assumed to follow the Pareto distribution, as postulated by Chaney (2008).
The model is outlined in appendix A. Under the assumption that ﬁxed market access costs
are incurred in destination wages, the CES model yields the identical gravity equation of
trade in expression (27). Hence, given per-capita income and population data, as well as
a value for the Pareto-shape parameter θ, the CES and the non-homothetic model return
identical lower productivity bounds. The identical calibrated minimum productivity bounds
and trade barriers, together with per-capita and population data, give rise to equivalent
Jevons indices of (relative) marginal costs of production and delivery in the two models.
Figure 3 plots the Jevons index of calibrated costs of production and delivery against
per-capita income of each country, under the trade barrier speciﬁcations of Waugh (2009)
and Eaton and Kortum (2002), respectively. For the CES model only, relative marginal costs
of production and delivery also represent relative prices across countries, since ﬁrms charge
constant mark-ups over marginal cost.


























































































Model with Waugh Trade Barriers [Jevons Index]


























































































Model with Eaton−Kortum Trade Barriers [Jevons Index]
Figure 3: Marginal Cost of Production and Delivery and Per-Capita GDP for 123 Countries
Prices in the CES model, via production and delivery costs, are dramatically diﬀerent
under the two trade-barrier speciﬁcations. When trade barriers are exporter-speciﬁc, prices
do not display a systematic relationship with per-capita income. However, when barriers are
importer-speciﬁc, poorer countries have systematically higher prices, as the elasticity of price
with respect to per-capita income is −0.1946(0.0418). To understand the diﬀerence, note
that poor countries have relatively low import- and export- to GDP ratios, which suggests
they are plagued by low productivity levels, resulting in high marginal costs of production.
When trade barriers are modeled to be exporter-speciﬁc, the low productivities of poor
exporters raise the trade barriers they face to export to any destination. Consequently, poor
exporters charge high prices regardless of the per-capita income of the market they sell to,
which results in an elasticity of price with respect to the income of a destination that is
not statistically diﬀerent from zero. On the other hand, when trade barriers are assumed
to be importer-speciﬁc, all exporters ﬁnd it particularly costly to sell to poor destinations.
Hence, poor countries not only incur high costs of production, but also impose high barriers
to trade, which results in high prices of tradable goods in these countries.
Waugh (2009) made the above argument for Ricardian models of trade that rely on the
CES utility speciﬁcation.45 Waugh (2009) further convincingly argued that poor countries
45Waugh (2009) demonstrated this ﬁnding using exact CES price indices, rather than the Jevons indices
used by the ICP, but the results were nearly identical.
23not only trade little, but they also export (import) systematically less (more) to (from) rich
countries. The observation led the author to conclude that exporter-speciﬁc barriers to trade
better capture bilateral trade ﬂows. However, even when trade barriers are exporter-speciﬁc,
CES models fail to generate a positive relationship between prices and per-capita income,
which is apparent in the left panel of ﬁgure 3, where the elasticity of price with respect to
income is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.





























































































Model with Waugh Trade Barriers [Jevons Index]





























































































Model with Eaton−Kortum Trade Barriers [Jevons Index]
Figure 4: Price Level of Final Tradable Goods and Per-Capita GDP for 123 Countries
The pricing-to-market mechanism introduced in this paper makes a great improvement
along the price dimension. Figure 4 plots Jevons price indices arising from the non-homothetic
model against per-capita income of each country, under the trade barrier speciﬁcations
of Waugh (2009) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), respectively.46 When trade barriers are
exporter-speciﬁc, the model yields an elasticity of the price level of tradables with respect to
per-capita income of 0.0850(0.0074), and when they are importer-speciﬁc, the correspond-
ing statistic is −0.0235(0.0213), which is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.47 Hence, the
46When trade barriers are asymmetric, arbitrage opportunities arise quite often. First, the barriers them-
selves violate triangular arbitrage 12,228 times. Thus, excluding trivial cases where trade barriers are inﬁnite,
τik > τijτjk in 12,228 cases. This suggests that asymmetric trade barriers pose a serious problem not only for
the non-homothetic model, but also for CES monopolistic competition frameworks, where due to constant
mark-ups, prices would violate arbitrage in the same number of instances. In fact, in the model with variable
mark-ups, prices violate arbitrage less frequently; 4,757 times when barriers are importer-speciﬁc, and 7,133
when they are exporter-speciﬁc.
47With exporter-speciﬁc trade barriers, the elasticity drops to 0.0847 (0.0074) when I add country popu-
24pricing-to-market mechanism neutralizes the strong force high trade barriers exert on prices
in poor countries when barriers are importer-speciﬁc. Moreover, under the preferred barrier
speciﬁcation of Waugh (2009), the non-homothetic model can generate over eighty percent
of the relationship between prices and income in the data, which is in line with the results
obtained from the benchmark calibration in section 4.1.2.
4.3 Importance of the Elasticity of Trade
The elasticity of trade parameter θ governs the response of prices and imported varieties
to the per-capita income of a country. Since each variety is produced by a diﬀerent ﬁrm, θ
necessarily aﬀects how the measure of exporting ﬁrms varies with destinations’ per-capita
income, as was shown in expression (19). Empirically, Eaton et al. (2004), Eaton et al.
(2008) and Arkolakis (2008b) report that in 1986, the elasticity of the number of French
ﬁrms selling to a market, normalized by their market share there, with respect to the per-
capita income of the destination is 0.71.48 Thus, for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, I
choose θ so that the model delivers an elasticity of the measure of US ﬁrms (normalized by
market share) to destination per-capita income of 0.71. With this targeted moment, and
symmetric trade barriers, I recalibrate the model and generate price levels of tradables.49
Figure 5 plots the prices of tradables against income, having chosen a value of θ of 2.625,
which matches US ﬁrm entry in diﬀerent markets. Moreover, the right panel of the plot
also shows the measure of US ﬁrms, normalized by market share per destination, in response
to the per-capita income of the market. Clearly, more US ﬁrms enter richer markets, with
the targeted elasticity of 0.7100(0.0645). Prices of tradables, in turn, respond to per-capita
income with an elasticity of 0.1202(0.0101), allowing the model to generate an even stronger
relationship than the one observed in the data.50
lation size to the regression, whose coeﬃcient is in turn -0.0065 (0.0074); and with importer-speciﬁc trade
barriers, the elasticity drops to a non-statistically signiﬁcant value of -0.0290 (0.0193) when I add country
population size to the regression, whose coeﬃcient is in turn -0.0998(0.0193) and is highly signiﬁcant.
48The studies also report that the elasticity of the number of French ﬁrms selling to a market, normalized
by their market share there, with respect to the population size of the destination is 0.57. Expression (19)
shows that the elasticity of trade, θ, is the only exogenously-speciﬁed parameter that governs the response of
ﬁrm entry to per-capita income and size, since productivities and trade barriers are calibrated in the general
equilibrium solution of the model. Given this restriction, the model cannot capture the response to both
variables jointly.
49With symmetric trade barriers, the calibrated model violates triangular arbitrage in only one instant,
which given the total number of triangular arbitrage permutations possible, is not statistically signiﬁcant.
50The elasticity drops to 0.1177 (0.0093) when I add country population size to the regression, whose
coeﬃcient is in turn -0.0454 (0.0093).





























































































Model: Prices VS Income [Jevons Index]































































































Model: Firm Entry VS Income
Figure 5: Prices, Firm Entry and Per-Capita Income
The quantitative success of the model reﬂects the choice of θ, which when lower, allows
per-capita income to exert a greater force on prices of tradables, as illustrated in expression
(26). Lower values of the elasticity of trade, θ, yield lower elasticities of substitution across
goods, allowing ﬁrms to price-discriminate more heavily. A strong relationship between
prices of tradables and per-capita income is a natural outcome.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that ﬁrms’ variable mark-ups represent a key contributor to the empir-
ically documented regularity that ﬁnal tradable goods’ prices are systematically positively
related to countries’ per-capita incomes. I outline a model in which trade barriers segment
international markets, allowing ﬁrms to exploit varying demand elasticities across countries
with diﬀerent income levels. Such behavior is apparent in a novel database I bring forward,
which features a clothing manufacturer who supplies products at systematically higher prices
to richer markets. Moreover, the mechanism I introduce in this paper further captures a doc-
umented empirical regularity that richer countries not only spend more per product, but also
consume more diverse bundles of goods. Quantitatively, the model suggests that variable
mark-ups can account for eighty percent of the observed positive relationship between prices
of tradables and income across 123 countries.
26On a broader scale, this paper emphasizes the role income diﬀerences play in shaping
cross-country price variation in tradable consumption goods as well as aggregate consump-
tion patterns. Since tradable goods account for an ever increasing portion of consumption
bundles of individuals, their prices directly aﬀect consumer welfare. Hence, having obtained
an understanding of one of the key mechanisms that aﬀect the behavior of prices across
countries, we can further pursue the measurement of welfare of consumers in an integrated
world economy.
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30Appendix
A CES Model
This section outlines a variant of the CES model of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008).
The maximization problem of a consumer in country j buying goods from (potentially)

























I retain the market structure of the non-homothetic model in the text. Then, the demand
for variety of type φ originating from country i consumed in a positive amount in country
j, qij (φ) > 0, is given by:52

















1−σ υj(φ)dφ, σ > 1. (30)
From (29), notice that the productivity threshold in this economy cannot be determined
using the demand for the cutoﬀ variety. Instead, it is necessary to introduce ﬁxed market
access costs in order to bound the measure of ﬁrms that serve each market.
Using (29), the proﬁt maximization problem of a ﬁrm with productivity draw φ originat-





















51CES utility constitutes a limiting case of the general utility function outlined earlier, with ¯ q → 0.
52I refer the reader to Melitz (2003) for detailed derivations of optimal rules in this economy. Arkolakis
(2008b) describes a procedure for computing equilibrium objects in this economy. The procedure is virtually
identical to the one I apply to the non-homothetic model, so I refrain from the details in this paper.
31In the above problem, I assume that each ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost, f > 0, in order to sell to a
particular market. Moreover, the ﬁxed cost is paid in terms of labor units of the destination
country.53
The optimal pricing rule of a ﬁrm with productivity draw φ ≥ φ∗
ij is given by a constant




B Price Levels of Final Tradable Goods
In this section, I describe the procedure used to derive the price level of ﬁnal tradable goods
in the data and the models analyzed in this paper.
I use data from the 2005 round of the International Comparison Program (ICP) at the
basic heading level provided by the World Bank. According to the ICP Handbook54, unit
price data on goods with identical characteristics are collected across retail locations in
the participating countries. The lowest level of aggregation is the basic heading (BH), which
represents a narrowly-deﬁned group of goods for which expenditure data are available. There
are a total of 129 BHs in the data set. Each BH contains a certain number of products.
Hence, the reported price of a BH is an aggregate price. An example of a basic heading is
“1101111 Rice”, which is made up of prices of diﬀerent types of rice contained in speciﬁc
packages.
In order to derive the price of a BH, the ICP uses a Jevons index.55 For all N countries
and I products within the basic heading, the ICP collects unit prices. The goal is to ﬁnd the
equivalent product in every country, thus washing away any quality diﬀerences. If an identical
product is not found, the price entry is either left blank, resulting in missing observations,
or a comparable product is found, ensuring that its speciﬁcations are carefully recorded so
that quality adjustments can be made to the price entry.
A numeraire country is chosen, USA, and prices are expressed in 2005 US dollars. The
Jevons index at the BH-level is a geometric average of relative prices of goods available in
the US and another country. However, not all goods are found in all countries, resulting in
price indices that are not transitive. Consequently, geometric averages are taken for every
53These two assumptions do not change the predictions of the model with respect to price levels, but
they help the model generate the gravity equation in expression (27). Hence, I can use the same parameter
estimates for the two models in the quantitative analysis of price levels.
54The ICP Handbook prepared by the World Bank is available at
http : //go.worldbank.org/V MCB80AB40.
55See Hill and Hill (2009) for a discussion of price index derivation methods in the 2005 ICP round.
32pair of countries in the sample, and then prices relative to the US are computed using cross
prices. The procedure, which yields transitive price indices, can be summarized as follows:















where Rjk denotes the number of goods available in both j and k.

















where N denotes the number of countries actually used in the relative price comparison.
Notice that if a pair of countries does not have any goods in common, the relative price
observation is missing and cannot be used to compute cross prices. Hence N is reduced
accordingly.
I use prices at the BH-level to arrive at the price level of ﬁnal tradable goods by computing
geometric averages across BHs that correspond to ﬁnal tradable categories for 123 countries.
Since there are no zero observations across these categories for the sample of countries I
study, the price levels are transitive.
I now describe the Jevons index as it applies to the non-homothetic model. In this
framework, a good is diﬀerentiated by the productivity of the ﬁrm producing it, as well as
the source country of the ﬁrm. Hence, it is natural to think of goods produced by ﬁrms with
identical productivities from diﬀerent source countries as varieties. In a destination, a basic
heading would then reﬂect the prices of the varieties produced with a particular productivity
across all sources from which that destination imports. Hence, there would be a continuum
of basic headings in each destination. As shown below, this is not a problem, since the
relative (not absolute) price of a variety across destinations does not reﬂect the productivity
of a ﬁrm producing it, hence all basic headings are identical.
First, I compute the Jevons index of a basic heading corresponding to productivity φ,
based on the goods available in destinations j and k. Given source country υ, if φ∗
υj  = φ∗
υk,
then not all ﬁrms from country υ serve both destinations. Hence, only basic headings
φ ≥ max[φ∗
υj,φ∗
υk] (∀υ) are relevant in my comparison. The relative price of basic heading
33φ ≥ max[φ∗
υj,φ∗















where Mjk is the number of source countries that export to both j and k.
However, the relative price a given ﬁrm φ charges in two destinations is independent of
the ﬁrm’s productivity, and only reﬂects relative trade barriers and bilateral productivity






















Using this expression in step 2 allows me to compute the Jevons index between countries j
and k for this particular basic heading. Since the relative price of the basic heading does not
depend on the productivity associated with producing varieties of this good, this statistic
also represents the entire Jevons index between a pair of countries.
The procedure to compute Jevons indices for the CES model is identical. In this case,
however, individual good prices simply reﬂect trade barriers and wages, since the model
yields constant mark-ups.
C Consumer Problem, Firm Problem and Equilibrium
C.1 Deriving Consumer Demand























where λj is the Lagrange multiplier. The FOCs yield (∀qc










υj be the set of all positively consumed varieties in country j. Letting Nυj
be the measure of set Ω∗
υj, the measure of Ω∗
j, Nj, is given by Nj =
 I
υ=1 Nυj.









′) + pυj (ω
′) ¯ q. (34)
Integrating over all ω′
υj ∈ Ω∗
j, keeping in mind that the measure of Ω∗
υj is Nυj, yields the










































































ij (ω) + ¯ q)
 




wj + ¯ qPj
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υj pυj (ω′)dω′ is an aggregate price statistic.
The total demand for variety ω from i by consumers in j becomes:
qij (ω) = Lj
 





C.2 Solving the Firm Problem
Recall (5), which gives the proﬁt maximization problem of a ﬁrm with productivity draw φ
originating in country i and considering to sell to country j. Since there is a continuum of
ﬁrms, an individual monopolistic competitor does not view aggregate variables, Pj and Nj,





wj + ¯ qPj
Nj(pij)2 = 0,










C.3 Solving for Equilibrium Objects
In this section, I rely on the Pareto distribution of ﬁrm productivities and characterize the
equilibrium objects of the model. I express all objects in terms of wages and then derive a
set of equations that solve for the wage rates of all countries simultaneously.
Straightforward algebraic manipulations allow me to obtain the aggregate price statistic
Pj, the measure of ﬁrms serving each destination Nij, and the productivity thresholds φ∗
ij,
in terms of wages and measures of entrants for each country.
As described in section 2.4, to solve the model, it is necessary to jointly determine wages,
wi, and the measures of entrants, Ji, ∀i. The system of equilibrium equations consists of the
free entry condition, (14), and the income/spending equality, (15), for each country.








 θ ¯ qτiυwiLυ
φ∗
iυ(θ + 1)(2θ + 1)
. (36)
The income/spending identity requires that country i’s consumers spend their entire income









































36(39) implicitly solves for the wage rate wi for each country i, where any i can be taken to be
the numeraire country, with remaining wages expressed relative to it.
D Calibration
Given a value of θ and bilateral trade barriers, estimated from the gravity equation of trade,
I can compute all lower productivity bounds bi using (39) and per-capita income (wi) and
population (Li) data. Since the system in (39) is homogeneous in b, I choose to normalize
bUS. This amounts to replacing the equation corresponding to i = US in (39) with an
expression that describes the moment in the data I choose in order to calibrate bUS. My
moment of choice is average US ﬁrm sales in 2002, which amount to USD 11,161,200. The
corresponding expression for average sales of all US ﬁrms is: US sales home and abroad,
divided by the measure of ﬁrms operating in the US (which implicitly includes US ﬁrms that








Next, I choose ¯ q to match average US ﬁrm size in 2002 of 41 workers. The corresponding
expression of average US ﬁrm size is the ratio of the US population, which equals total






























Notice the resemblance between expression (42) and (39) for i = US. Indeed (42) serves the
purpose of (39) under the proposed normalization. Hence, expression (39) for all i  = US,
together with (42) for the US, calibrate all lower-productivity bounds in this economy. Sub-
sequently, the numerical value of ¯ q is computed from 42. Finally, to ensure that productivity
cutoﬀs do not lie below calibrated productivity lower bounds, an adjustment to the ﬁxed
37entry cost fe is necessary. I choose fe such that mini,j φ∗
ij/bi = 1, that is, the ﬁxed entry cost
is just low enough so that the lowest productivity cutoﬀ is just equal to its corresponding
lower bound. Thus, for at least one country, all potential producers end up producing in
equilibrium.
E Extensive Margin of Imports








where mW is world imports, miWs is world imports from country i in category s, Mijs is the
set of source-categories (i,s) for which mijs > 0, and mijs is j’s imports from i in category




i =υ Tiυ. A source-category pair in the model corresponds to a variety produced by ﬁrm
with draw φ originating from country i. This variety is positively imported by j if and only
if φ ≥ φ∗
ij. Hence, Mijs is the set containing all such varieties. Finally, for a given good
φ ∈ Mijφ, notice that miWφ =
 
υ piυ(φ)xiυ(φ), where the entry is zero for those countries
that do not import the good, φ < φ∗
iυ. Thus, when computing world imports of all goods
that belong to set Mijφ, I only need to account for goods produced by ﬁrms with productivity
φ ≥ max(φ∗
iυ,φ∗
ij)(∀i  = j,υ  = j), as the remaining goods are either not positively-consumed
by j, or not positively consumed by υ, or both.


















F Tables and Figures
This section contains all ﬁgures and tables referred to in the text.




















































































Productivity of Wholesale & Retail Trade vs Per−Capita Income




















































































Productivity of Transport & Storage vs Per−Capita Income
Figure 6: Productivity of Distribution Sectors and Per-Capita Income





































































































Sales Tax vs Per−Capita Income










Log Per Capita GDP (relative to US)



























































































Per−Capita Advertising Expenditure vs Per−Capita Income
Figure 7: Sales Taxes, Advertising Expenditures and Per-Capita Income
39Table 1: Coeﬃcients from Good Fixed-Eﬀects Regression of Log Prices on Logs of Per-Capita
Income, DHL Shipping and Controls
Sample Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Included PCGDP PCGDP PCGDP PCGDP
Variables DHL DHL DHL DHL
—————– Region Region Region
Stores Stores Stores






(A) Log PCGDP (0.0761 (0.0750 (0.0736 (0.3701
(0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0076) (0.0123)
*33.66 *17.61 *9.72 *30.17
(B) Log PCGDP (0.1204 (0.0663 (0.2172 (0.2120
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0092) (0.0099)
*44.19 *20.67 *23.55 *21.44
Data Sources: Price data obtained by author from March/September 2008 online catalogues of
clothing manufacturer Mango. DHL Express quotes collected from DHL Online. Store count
data collected from each company’s store locator website. Nominal per-capita income and
population data for 2007 from WDI. Gini coeﬃcient data is averaged over 96-07 period from
WDI. Advertising cost data from ZenithOptimedia. Exchange rate data from ECB.
Sample (A)
All prices are converted to Euro using February/August 2008 average monthly exchange rates.
(1) 28 countries including: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK.
(2) Regions: Mediterranean, Scandinavian, Eastern. Competitors: Zara, Miss Sixty, Bershka.
(3) Excludes Cyprus and Malta due to data limitations.
(4) Excludes Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Eastern dummy due to data limitations.
Sample (B)
All prices in Euro by default, since countries are members of Eurozone.
(1) 15 countries including: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain.
(2) Regions: Mediterranean, Scandinavian, Eastern. Competitors: Zara, Miss Sixty, Bershka.
(3) Excludes Cyprus and Malta due to data limitations.
(4) Excludes Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Eastern dummy due to data limitations.
40